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Abstract 
Based on a large dataset from eight Asian economies, we test the impact of post-crisis 
regulatory reforms on the performance of depository institutions in countries at 
different levels of financial development. We allow for technological heterogeneity and 
estimate a set of country-level stochastic cost frontiers followed by a deterministic 
bootstrapped meta-frontier to evaluate cost efficiency and cost technology. Our results 
support the view that liberalization policies have a positive impact on bank 
performance, while the reverse is true for prudential regulation policies. The removal of 
activities restrictions, bank privatization and foreign bank entry have a positive and 
significant impact on technological progress and cost efficiency. In contrast, prudential 
policies, which aim to protect the banking sector from excessive risk-taking, tend to 
adversely affect banks cost efficiency but not cost technology.  
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1. Introduction  
In this paper we investigate the impact of financial liberalization policies and 
concomitant prudential regulation initiatives on the performance of Asian banks 
following the 1997 financial crisis. From a theoretical perspective, the effects of 
regulation on bank efficiency are not well-defined. The larger part of policy literature on 
financial regulation has been inspired by the wider debate on the role of government in 
the economy. The two best-known opposing views in this area are the public interest 
view and the private interest view. Although both views agree on the assumption of 
market failure, they disagree on how to minimize it. For the public interest view, 
governments act in the public interest. In this setting, well-conceived regulation can 
exert a positive effect on firm behaviour by fostering competition and encouraging 
effective corporate governance. Therefore, governments regulate to ensure better 
functioning and thus more efficient banks, ultimately for the benefit of the economy as 
a whole. The alternative private interest view sees regulation as a product of private 
interests or lobby groups, who use the coercive power of the state to extract rents at the 
expense of other groups (Stigler 1971). This view thus suggests that regulation can be 
used to foster the interest of the few in power and therefore hinder the efficiency of 
firms, as these are constrained to channel resources to special-interest groups. Given 
that banking is one of the most highly regulated industries, these distortions could be 
particularly important and lead to vast inefficiencies. 
While the theoretical debate is still unsettled, empirically the private interest view is 
more consistent with the data. Barth et al. (2008) find that regulatory approaches that 
support private sector monitoring of banks and strengthen incentives for market 
monitoring, improve bank performance. 
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Nevertheless, there is no evidence of any common set of rules that is universally 
appropriate for promoting well-functioning banks. Regulatory structures that lead to 
successful outcomes in some countries may not work in other countries that have 
different institutional settings. As pointed out by Barth et al. (2013), there is no broad 
cross-country evidence as to which of the many different regulations and supervisory 
practices employed around the world work best. As a consequence, the question of how 
regulation affects bank performance remains unanswered.  
Broadly speaking, the changing set of regulation can be classified into rules that foster 
financial liberalisation and rules that impose restrictions on activities. More specifically, 
financial liberalization (or deregulation) refers to policies that reduce the restrictions 
imposed on banks’ conduct, including entry, permissible activities or interest rates. 
Their primary aim is to foster competition and improve the efficiency of financial 
intermediaries. Prudential rules, on the other hand, aim at improving financial sector 
stability by imposing capital and liquidity ratios, as well as other forms of control on 
bank permissible activities. While the aims of financial reforms are clear, to foster a 
well-functioning financial sector, their long-term economic impact is controversial, as 
evidenced by the number of financial crises around the world. In addition, different 
policies can have conflicting objectives and therefore their aggregate impact on the 
financial sector in the long term may depend upon the timing of the reforms, the 
structure of the financial sector and the level of financial development of a particular 
country. The reasons behind the success or failure of particular policies are often 
complex, and regulators around the world are still struggling with the issue of what is 
good regulation and which reforms constitute good practice (Ayadi et al., 2016). 
Despite the relevance of the issue, no general academic consensus exists about the 
effects of prudential regulation and liberalization on financial sector performance. This 
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is all the more important as following the global financial crisis of 2007-09 many 
countries have embarked on a similar process of reform of their banking sectors.  
This paper aims to fill this and related gaps in the literature by exploring how the 
simultaneous adoption of specific liberalization and prudential regulation policies 
affected bank performance in eight major Asian economies after the 1997 crisis. We 
collect bank regulation information from four recent world-wide surveys conducted by 
Barth, Caprio and Levine (2001, 2003, 2007 and 2012) and made available by the 
World Bank. We examine the impact on bank efficiency of capital regulation, activities 
restrictions, supervisory powers, credit market deregulation and market discipline. 
From a theoretical perspective, the predictions are not clear. For example, more 
stringent capital regulation should promote better bank performance as higher capital 
aligns the interests of bank shareholders, depositors and creditors and should result in 
increased lending standards and lower banks’ risk taking incentives. On the other hand, 
costly capital can increase entry barriers, thereby decreasing competition and allowing 
banks to extract monopoly rents.  
Similar opposing views are put forward with regards to activities restrictions. On the one 
hand restrictions prevent banks from diversifying into more profitable sources of 
income and therefore should be negatively related to bank performance. On the other 
hand, by increasing the complexity of banks activities diversification can increase moral 
hazard and provide opportunities for increased risk taking and ultimately impact 
negatively on bank performance.  
Powerful supervisors should monitor and discipline banks effectively, thereby fostering 
good corporate governance and good performance. On the other hand, powerful 
supervisors may abuse their power and constrain the allocation of credit for political 
reasons. Finally, greater market discipline should encourage well performing banks. 
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However, market discipline is achieved through mandatory information disclosure, 
which can be costly. These different mechanisms are constantly at play and therefore 
the impact of various regulatory changes on bank efficiency remains an empirical 
question. More details on the relevant theoretical and empirical literature are offered in 
Section 3.  
The period that followed the 1997 Asian financial crisis provides us with a unique 
opportunity to address these issues, given the unique and dynamic regional 
characteristics of the Asian banking markets. The region comprises countries at 
different stages of economic and financial development. In the aftermath of the crisis, 
the process and pace of their regulatory reforms varied substantially. In most countries, 
the renewed emphasis on financial reform translated into the adoption of tighter 
prudential rules and restructuring programmes which went hand in hand with the 
acceleration of liberalization policies aimed at restructuring the financial services sector 
and promote economic growth.  This process resulted in substantial changes in market 
structure, deriving both from greater foreign presence and from increased privatization 
across the region. Such diversification provides us with an excellent laboratory to 
understand the impact of regulatory reforms on banks’ performance.  
To investigate this issue, we build a large panel dataset encompassing depository 
institutions from China, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, the Philippines 
and Thailand over the period 2001-2010. We control for different ownership 
structures, concentration and risk, as well as for the separate impact on efficiency of 
different policy changes. The length of our time series allows us to analyse the effects of 
both financial liberalization and the reintroduction of prudential policies on efficiency 
and cost technology. This longer time span also allows for a fuller development of the 
policy effects, enhancing the reliability of the results. In this, we provide a novel 
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contribution, as most of the existing literature on the impact of the Asian crisis focuses 
on its immediate aftermath and empirical investigations often stop in the early 2000s. 
Unlike most of the literature we test for and find technological heterogeneity across 
countries, which prevents the use of a pooled data set. We therefore estimate a set of 
stochastic cost frontiers at the country level first, followed by the estimation of a 
deterministic, bootstrapped cross-country meta-frontier, that allows us make reliable 
cross country comparisons and explore in detail which countries and bank types led the 
technological developments of the period. 
Our main results show that liberalization policies such as the removal of activities 
restrictions, privatization and opening to foreign banks have a positive and significant 
impact on technological progress and cost efficiency. In contrast, prudential re-
regulation policies tend to adversely affect banks cost efficiency although they do not 
significantly impact on cost technology.  
Policies that aim to strengthen prudential regulation should take into account the 
potential negative effects on bank efficiency, with a view to balance the need to foster 
stability without hindering financial intermediation. Our results are consistent with 
Barth et al (2013), who find that tighter restrictions on bank activities are negatively 
associated with bank efficiency while greater capital regulation, greater official 
supervisory power and enhanced market-based monitoring are positively associated 
with bank efficiency.  
The use of a meta-frontier model allows us to compare banks cross-country and to 
identify which banks from which countries utilize the best available technology. We find 
that Chinese and Japanese banks are the best performers in the region, with the highest 
median efficiency scores and the highest number of technology leaders (i.e. banks on 
the meta-frontier). Japanese banks enjoy the benefits of the “Financial Big Bang” of the 
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late 90s, whose effects last into the early 2000s. Chinese banks overtake their Japanese 
peers from 2006 onwards, consistently with the boom period in the Chinese economy 
corresponding to the full implementation of its ambitious financial reforms. While 
Chinese banks were not affected by the 1997 Asian financial crisis, banks in Hong 
Kong, Malaysia and the Philippines suffered considerably. In Malaysia in particular, the 
crisis resulted in the tightening of prudential policies and restrictions on permissible 
activities, which possibly contributed to their poor performance. Finally, our results also 
show that private and foreign banks play a key role in promoting technological progress 
across the region, therefore providing supporting evidence to the benefits of foreign 
bank presence in terms of technological spill-overs. The influence of foreign banks can 
be seen by looking at their proportion among technology leaders. While this is very 
high in Hong Kong, given the structure of its banking system, it is also very important in 
China where they have a very small market share. It appears that the opening of the 
banking sector to foreign banks has enabled Chinese banks to benefit from 
technological spill-overs.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 gives an overview of the Asian 
banking systems and the changes following the financial crisis. A review of the literature 
on the efficiency effects of banking regulation and liberalization is provided in Section 
3, while Section 4 describes the data and the methodology. Section 5 presents the 
empirical results, and concluding remarks are presented in Section 6. 
 
2.   An overview of Asian banking 
Bank intermediation plays an important role in Asian financial systems, matched by 
relatively under-developed capital markets. The pace and timing of financial reforms 
varied widely across the region; some countries started as early as the 1970s and early 
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1980s (Japan, Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines) while others embarked in major 
reform programs only in the 1990s (India, Hong Kong, Thailand) or later (China). 
Liberalization policies usually commenced with interest rates deregulation and in some 
instances moved to the opening of capital accounts to international investors, and to 
differing levels of privatization and foreign bank entry (Klapper et al., 2014). The fast 
pace of some of these liberalization processes, coupled with the free capital flows, 
pegged exchange rates, and weak management and legal systems, led to the financial 
crisis of 1997, which started in Thailand and quickly spread to varying degrees to 
neighbouring countries. During the crisis a number of banks failed whilst others were 
nationalized, restructured and later re-privatized. The restructuring programs (in the 
form of compulsory M&As) worked as an exit strategy for weak banks in Indonesia, 
Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand and Japan until about 2001, becoming more market 
driven thereafter. In countries less affected by the crisis, such as China, Hong Kong and 
India, structural changes in the domestic banking sector were primarily the result of the 
acceleration of bank liberalization and of reforms in corporate governance.  
The interplay of the various reforms led to significant changes in market structure, the 
most relevant of which are reported below. As we can see in Figure 1, ownership 
structure becomes increasingly diversified. The efficiency-driven corporate governance 
reforms reduce the state ownership of banks especially in the countries where it was 
predominant, increasing the role of foreign and private institutions. The resulting 
patterns are however very different across the region. 
Insert Figure 1 here 
The change in market structure shows up also in the concentration of assets, as 
measured by the CR5 (the aggregate share of the top 5 banks) reported in Figure 2: 
while concentration increases in markets traditionally dominated by families or the 
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private sector (such as Hong Kong, Japan, Malaysia and the Philippines), a gradual 
process of decentralization takes place in those formerly dominated by state-ownership 
(China, Indonesia and India), as a result of privatization.  
Insert Figure 2 here 
Changes in concentration do not necessarily imply changes in competitiveness, so more 
specific information is reported in Table 1 for the period of analysis. The table also 
includes the average value for the region as well as values for the European Monetary 
Union (EMU) and the US for comparative purposes. 
Insert Table 1 here 
The general pattern in net interest margins (NIM) is increasing, suggesting a possible 
reduction in the competitiveness of banking sectors – the opposite trend as observed in 
their Western comparators. This could be due, among other things, to the shift of 
regulatory focus from deregulation to bank re-regulation and the adoption of 
international banking practices (the Basel Accords) to strengthen the banking system. 
The rest of Table 1 seems to suggest that these efforts produced positive results. Capital 
adequacy ratios (CAR) increase and by 2010 they exceed 9% of total assets in most 
economies. This extra prudence is justified by the relatively high levels (by international 
standards) of non-performing loans (NPL) which however steadily decline from a 
regional average of 18% to less than 3%. In addition, increased return on assets (ROA) 
and lower cost to income ratios (CIR) could suggest an improvement in operational 
efficiency, as opposed to the worsening profitability in the EMU and US where 
performance is clearly affected by the recent financial crisis.  
The above are very general statistics on how the interplay of regulation and deregulation 
might have affected Asian banking markets. Although they appear to have been 
relatively resilient to the global financial crisis, uncertainties remain about their long 
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term development. We review the main contributions of the literature in the next 
section, before embarking on our empirical work.   
3. Regulatory reform and efficiency: a brief literature review 
Financial deregulation (or liberalization) refers to policies that reduce the restrictions 
imposed on banks’ entry, permissible activities or interest rates. Their primary aim is to 
foster competition and improve the efficiency of financial intermediaries, but their 
ultimate effects are controversial.   
Earlier studies focus on the US and produce mixed results (see for example Bauer et 
al., 1993; Jayaratne and Strahan, 1996; and Berger and Mester, 2003). Studies focusing 
on Western Europe tend to find a positive relationship between deregulation and bank 
efficiency (Hasan and Marton, 2003), as do some more recent studies investigating 
Central and Eastern Europe (Koutsomanoli et al., 2009; Davutyan and Yildirim, 2015).
1
 
Focusing on Asian markets, a positive relationship between deregulation and 
productivity growth is found by Gilbert and Wilson (1998) for Korean banks in the late 
80s and early 90s; and by Leightner and Lovell (1998) for the Thai banking market 
between 1990 and 1994. Chen et al. (2005) examine the impact of China’s financial 
deregulation in the mid-1990s and find an improvement in cost efficiency. Fu and 
Heffernan (2009) highlight the modest improvements in performance in the early stages 
of reform in China, mainly enjoyed by joint-stock banks, and conclude in favour of 
further market openness and liberalization. Looking at India, while Kumbhakar and 
Sarkar (2003) find no growth in banks’ total factor productivity (TFP) following 
financial liberalization in the early 1990s, Zhao et al. (2010) and Casu et al. (2013) 
extend the period of observation to 1992-2009 and find instead a sustained growth in 
                                                 
1 Davutyan and Yildirim find that the improvements in the competitiveness and profit efficiency of 
Turkish banks do however vary with ownership type. Foreign and private institutions lead the changes 
while State banks lag behind due to political interference. 
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TFP, mainly led by technological progress and by the role played by foreign banks. An 
interesting post-crisis, cross-country analysis is offered by Chan et al (2014), who use 
DEA and Tobit models to evaluate the impact of off-balance sheet exposure and other 
risk measures on the cost and profit efficiency of 7 East Asian countries. While their 
focus, methodology and sample are different from ours some of their findings are 
similar especially in terms of relative cost efficiency rankings. 
A great deal of the literature focuses specifically on the effects of foreign banks entry, 
once again with opposite views and findings. Foreign banks from more developed 
banking systems are expected to have superior management skills, screening and 
production technologies, efficiency and profitability. This can benefit host countries via 
technological improvements, increased competition and improved stability (Althammer 
and Haselman, 2011; Luo et al, 2015). On the other hand foreign banks might suffer 
from cost and informational diseconomies due to operating from a distance and from 
their different modes of entry (Naaborg and Lensink, 2008; Claeys and Heinz, 2014); 
or they might cherry pick the best customers thus damaging the profitability of local 
institutions
2
. 
The (enormous) empirical evidence again is mixed but generally positive. Focusing on 
Asian markets, the cross country studies of Laeven (2005) and Williams and Nguyen 
(2005) find that foreign banks have stronger profit efficiency, which is transferred to 
local banks with a lag. Similar conclusions are reached for South Korean markets by 
Jeon and Miller (2005) and Jeon et al. (2006); by Casu et al. (2013) for India; by 
Detragiache and Gupta (2006) for Malaysia; and by Jiang at al. (2009), Lin and Zhang 
(2009) and He and Fan (2004) for China, who also point out the benefits that foreign 
banks carry in terms of new and better services. Similar conclusions are reached by Luo 
                                                 
2 A good review of the literature on foreign bank entry is provided Clarke et al., (2003). 
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et al. (2015) who find strong evidence of the beneficial knowledge transfer effects from 
foreign to domestic banks in China. They find that proximity to foreign branches 
increased the profitability and efficiency of domestic banks especially in the period of 
greater liberalization. 
Overall, the empirical evidence on the effect of deregulatory policies on bank 
productivity growth and efficiency is mixed. This outcome may relate to the fact that 
deregulation comprises of many different policy initiatives which can impact on bank 
performance in different ways. However the existing literature tends to treat 
deregulation as one aggregate policy, rather than considering its multi-faceted nature. A 
further difficulty arises from the fact that often governments implement deregulatory 
policies along with re-regulatory ones, which complicates the analysis of their effects.  
Re-regulation (or prudential re-regulation) refers to a mixture of supervisory and 
restrictive policies that aim to protect the banking sector from excessive risk-taking. The 
instruments of prudential re-regulation have evolved over time in a number of ways. 
Firstly, given the increasing complexity of the banking business, the objective of official 
supervision shifted from monitoring banks’ activities to fostering banks’ internal 
management. Secondly, capital norms tightened over time. Thirdly, private monitoring 
that relies on market mechanisms to discipline banks’ activities became a key tool of the 
supervisory system. These elements constitute the three pillars of the Basel accords.  
From a theoretical point of view these instruments may have opposite effects on bank 
performance, and this uncertainty is reflected in the inconsistency of empirical 
evidence.  For example higher capital requirements may lower banks’ cost of borrowing 
as banks are perceived as safer and less likely to fail. On the other hand they might 
burden banks with unnecessary costs. In particular, if banks are forced to raise equity 
capital at a price higher than the interest rate on deposits, an increase in capital 
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requirements may discourage bank lending (Thakor, 1996). Official supervision may 
reduce market failures by monitoring banks and improving the quality of bank lending 
(Beck et al., 2006). Powerful supervisors, however, may abuse their powers to benefit 
their associates and extract bribes (Shleifer and Vishny, 1998) with detrimental effects 
on bank intermediation. Finally, the success of market discipline depends crucially on 
the accuracy of investors’ information on the financial conditions of a bank, and on 
their ability to influence, via their behaviour, the behaviour of other banks (Bliss and 
Flannery, 2002). Given the complexity and opacity of the banking sector, the effective 
implementation of private monitoring is difficult even in developed economies. For this 
reason, reliance on private monitoring may lead to the exploitation of depositors and 
poor bank performance.  
From an empirical perspective, one of the earliest studies analysing the link between 
regulation and efficiency is that of Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2004) who find that tightening 
regulation increases the cost of intermediation, but that the role of regulatory variables 
becomes insignificant when controlling for economic freedom or property rights 
protection. These results support the view that different bank regulations cannot be 
viewed independently. Similarly Barth et al. (2004) find that tightening activity 
restrictions lowers banks’ efficiency. In addition they show that policies that enforce 
accurate information disclosure and private monitoring work best to enhance bank 
efficiency, whereas they find no evidence that capital requirements and official 
supervisory power improve bank performance. A voluminous literature supports the 
view that private monitoring contributes to the improvement of bank efficiency 
(Pasiouras et al., 2009; Haw et al., 2010; Delis et al., 2011), while only limited evidence 
exists that official supervisory oversight and capital requirements help improve financial 
intermediation (Pasiouras et al., 2009). In particular, Chortareas et al. (2012) find that 
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all forms of regulatory policy hamper the efficient operation of banks. These results 
raise a cautionary flag as to the effects of regulation on bank performance.  
Very few studies look at the Asian markets. Thangavelu and Findlay (2013) examine the 
impact of banks off-balance sheet activities, foreign penetration, regulation and 
supervision on the DEA-efficiency scores of six South-East Asian banking markets 
between 1994 and 2008. They find that official supervision helps improve banks’ 
efficiency but that private monitoring actually decreases it. Zhao et al. (2010) and Casu 
et al. (2013) identify a sustained productivity growth in India following the prudential re-
regulation period but do not separately identify the re-regulatory instruments.  Banker 
et al. (2010) investigate the post-1997 regulatory changes in South Korea and find that 
policies aimed at strengthening banks’ capital structure and risk management do not 
have a uniform impact on bank productivity, but rather favour strategically privileged 
banks. Overall the little existing evidence from the Asian banking markets seems to 
suggest that supervisory oversight works better than private monitoring, possibly because 
it is more difficult for emerging economies to move towards a disclosure strategy, given 
that information asymmetry problems are more acute.  
We highlighted in the introduction how we think our study contributes to the existing 
literature. Our data, methodology and empirical results are therefore explored next. 
4.  Methodology and data. 
The general aim of this paper is to analyse how regulatory reforms and various bank 
characteristics have affected bank cost efficiency on a panel dataset of eight Asian 
economies and to identify the countries and types of bank that led the technological 
changes. First, we test for technological heterogeneity using likelihood-ratio (LR) tests. 
We strongly reject the null hypothesis and conclude that banks from different countries 
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operate under different technologies. As a consequence we estimate a set of country-
level stochastic frontiers to analyse the determinants of cost efficiency, followed by the 
estimation of a meta-frontier in order to make cross-country comparisons. 
 In the remainder of this section we first present the stochastic frontier model; then we 
describe the dataset and variables in more detail and provide some descriptive statistics; 
finally we discuss the meta-frontier model. 
4.1 The stochastic frontier model 
The stochastic frontier approach is a long established model for measuring firms’ 
efficiency
3. The essence of the model consists of measuring firms’ efficiency as the 
distance from a best performance frontier which is not explained by statistical noise. In 
general terms, and within a panel setting, a stochastic cost frontier is specified as:  
itit
XTCTC   );(          (1) 
where εit = vit + uit. In (1) the observed total cost TC of bank i at time t, depends on a set 
of independent variables X and on a vector of parameters β to estimate. The peculiarity 
of the model lies in its composed error term εit given by the sum of a symmetric, 
normally distributed random noise component vit~N(0, σ2v) and a non-negative 
component uit representing firm-level inefficiency. Following Battese and Coelli (1995) 
inefficiency can be expressed as a function of some variables Z by modelling it as a 
truncated normal distribution with variable mean and constant variance, that is 
uit~N
+
(Zitδ, σ2u), as in: 
ititit
eZu             (2) 
                                                 
3 Details about the estimation of stochastic frontier models, including the process for model selection, 
can be found for example in Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000). 
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The error eit in (2) is defined by truncating a 0-mean normal distribution at point -Zitδ, 
to guarantee that uit > 0.  Equations (1) and (2) are estimated simultaneously by 
Maximum Likelihood, thus avoiding the problems related to two-stage estimation 
procedures. 
To allow for flexibility in the estimation of (1) and following an established literature we 
choose a translog functional form. Our full model specification is written as: 
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   (4) 
In Equation (3) the dependent variable is total cost TC, which is defined as the sum of 
total interest and operating expenses. In the specification of the inputs and outputs, we 
follow the intermediation approach  and specify input prices (w) as price of labour (PL), 
price of physical capital (PC), and price of funds (PF), respectively
4
; outputs (q) are 
defined as net loans (LN), other earning assets (OEA), and net fees and commissions 
(NFC). Net loans are used instead of gross loans to control for the differences in output 
quality. Net fees and commissions are included as an output because fee-based activities 
constitute an increasing source of income for banks (Chan et al., 2014).  Various studies 
have highlighted the importance of incorporating risk factors on bank cost technology, 
as a bank’s strategic decisions regarding asset quality and capital composition affect the 
risk premium of its outputs and input prices (Mester, 1996, Hughes and Mester, 2013). 
We control for three risk factors (RK) in our model: capital ratio (CR), volatility of 
                                                 
4 For reasons of space we provide the details on variables calculation in the appendix, Table A1. 
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returns on assets (VOroa) and loan loss provisions (LLP). CR reflects the risk 
preferences of banks. A risk-averse bank might hold a capital level above the minimum 
regulatory requirement. Since capital is often more expensive than deposits this might 
translate into higher costs. On the other hand, better capitalisation and lower leverage 
can signal the bank as a less risky institution and this could reduce its cost of borrowing 
on the interbank market. VOroa reflects banks’ overall risk. Riskier banks may be more 
profitable but might incur higher costs to manage the risk. Finally, LLP measures 
banks’ credit risk: a higher level of loan loss provisions signals a higher probability of 
loans default and therefore lower average asset quality. On the one hand, poorer asset 
quality should increase banks’ borrowing costs; on the other hand, it could be the result 
of a lower ex ante investment in screening and monitoring activities which would show 
up as short-run cost savings.  
In line with the aims of the analysis, individual policy measures are entered in Equation 
(4) as determinants of inefficiency, and are described more in detail below and in Table 
A1. Their aggregate effect
5
 on the cost frontier is captured by two regulatory indicators 
(RG,) which are computed as averages of the individual policy indices: a deregulation 
variable (Dereg) and a re-regulation variable (Rereg), measuring respectively the extent 
to which the banking market of a country is liberalised and the strength of prudential 
regulations. Finally a quadratic time trend (T and T
2
) captures technological progress 
over time, and annual GDP growth (GDP) controls for other differences in the general 
macroeconomic environment.   
                                                 
5 Unfortunately we could not include these effects separately also in the deterministic part of the 
frontier. In two countries collinearity issues would have made the set of variables different and this 
would violate the requirement of consistency in variables and functional form between the stochastic 
frontiers and the meta-frontier (Battese and Rao, 2002).    
Page | 18 
 
Coming to the determinants of inefficiency of Equation (4), ACTR and CMD are 
indices of banking deregulation. The former measures the removal of activity 
restrictions. The latter the extent of credit market deregulation, such as the removal of 
interest rate controls, the intensity of competition from foreign banks etc. (see 
Appendix A for more details). In both cases, the higher is the index value the more 
liberalised is the banking system. Their average constitutes the aggregate deregulation 
measure (Dereg) that enters the deterministic part of the stochastic frontier. CAPS, 
SUPP and MARD are measures of prudential re-regulation corresponding to the 3 
pillars of the Basel agreements: they are indices respectively of the strength of capital 
stringency policy, of supervision power and of market discipline. Greater values indicate 
more stringent capital requirements, stronger supervisory oversight and a higher degree 
of information disclosure. Their average constitutes the aggregate measure of re-
regulation (Rereg) that enters the deterministic part of the stochastic frontier. All 
regulatory indices are scaled by the maximum value in each group to ensure that they 
are bound between 0 and 1, easing comparisons and aggregation. We also include the 
dummies STATE, FOR, and COOP to capture State, foreign and cooperative 
ownership respectively, thus leaving private domestic ownership as the base category. 
Finally we control for the degree of market concentration with the Herfindhal-
Hirshman index (HHI). A highly concentrated banking market could signal 
uncompetitive conditions and hence have detrimental implications for efficiency.  
4.2 Data  
Our sample consists of a panel of bank-level and country-level data from eight Asian 
economies (China, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, the Philippines and 
Thailand) over the period 2001-2010. The sample includes all types of depository 
institutions (commercial banks, saving banks and cooperatives - except for cooperative 
Page | 19 
 
banks from Japan
6
), resulting in a total of 3,576 observations, after allowing for outliers 
and missing data. Table 2 provides some summary statistics for each of the eight 
countries across the period of study. Financial information is obtained from Bankscope. 
Insert Table 2 here 
As showed by the volume of total assets, costs and output levels reported in Table 2, 
banks in Japan, China and Hong Kong are substantially larger than in other countries 
and also enjoy lower input prices. In all cases loans are the most important output, 
whereas fees and commissions have a much smaller weight. The countries that were 
most affected by the Asian crisis tend to have higher capital ratios, larger return 
volatilities and higher loan loss provisions. As we observed before, State ownership still 
plays a predominant role in China, India and Indonesia, and the presence of foreign 
banks is generally very limited, especially if compared to other emerging economies. 
Table 3 and Figure 3 show the patterns of the individual and aggregate indices of 
deregulation and re-regulation, respectively. All regulatory variables are not continuous 
but collected at four separate points in time. They are obtained from the World Bank 
survey database (Barth et al., 2001, 2003, 2007, 2012) and the Economic Freedom 
Index of the Heritage Foundation. 
Insert Table 3 here 
Insert Figure 3 here 
Hong Kong is by far the most liberalised country and together with Japan is the only 
case where the degree of deregulation remains consistently higher than that of re-
regulation. In all other cases the aggregate index of re-regulatory policies catches up and 
                                                 
6 There are more than 400 cooperative banks in Japan and they are small, local, “not-for-profit” 
organizations. Kano and Tsutsui (2003) find that loan markets for cooperative banks in Japan are 
segmented by prefecture, implying that they do not compete on the same platform as the regional and 
national players. We therefore decided to exclude them from our sample. For a specific analysis of the 
efficiency of Japanese cooperative banks see for example Glass et al. (2013). 
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even overtakes that of deregulation. China’s more cautious liberalization approach is 
reflected by its lower levels of deregulation (they are the lowest in the sample) and their 
slower increasing pattern compared to the much stronger increase in re-regulation. 
Despite having among the lowest capital requirements China places a relatively greater 
effort on information disclosure to foster market discipline and by the end of the 
sample period it has the second highest aggregate level of re-regulation. Capital 
stringency requirements increase steadily throughout the sample but particularly so in 
Indonesia and the Philippines. Both countries, along with Thailand, were among the 
first to introduce liberalization policies before the Asian crisis as well as among the 
worst affected by it. All countries show increasing levels of re-regulation, while the 
patterns of deregulation vary. This heterogeneity is very useful for our intended 
research purposes.  
 
4.3 The meta-frontier model 
Many researchers have observed that the assumption of a common frontier in a cross-
country scenario is quite unwarranted given the differences in banking environments 
and in the level and quality of services associated with bank intermediation (Dietsch and 
Lozano-Vivas, 2000; Chaffai et al., 2001). If the banking technology across, say, g 
countries is not homogeneous then the estimation of a pooled frontier will produce 
biased results. As a solution, Battese and Rao (2002) and Battese et al. (2004) propose a 
meta-frontier model. The meta-frontier is conceived as a theoretical super-technology 
(the meta-technology) that all the g individual technologies belong to and can 
theoretically access. In other words, the meta-frontier models the possibility of 
technological spill-overs between the different g groups (countries) even if such spill-
overs are not perfect and therefore we observe technological heterogeneity. 
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The meta-frontier can be estimated by linear programming as a deterministic, 
parametric function that envelops the g country-specific frontiers. In particular, if each 
country-specific frontier is given by  
)exp()exp( g
it
g
it
g
it
g
it
uvXC  
       (5)
 
with its own set of parameters βg, the meta-frontier is defined as: 
)exp()( *** 
ititit
XXfC 
        (6)
 
Equation (6) has the same functional form as Equation (5) and its own set of parameters 
β* estimated subject to the constraint Xitβ* ≤ Xitβg, to guarantee that the meta-cost 
technology will never have costs larger than any of the country-specific cost 
technologies. 
The distance of each firm from the meta-frontier defines its meta-efficiency; this is given 
by the product of the country-specific inefficiency and the Technological Gap Ratio 
(TGR), i.e.:  
it
g
itit
TGRuu **           (7) 
The TGR therefore measures the distance between the meta-frontier and the country- 
specific frontier and it is ≤ 1. The closer to 1 is a firm’s TGR value, the closer that firm 
is to using the optimal meta-technology. TGRs can therefore offer valuable insight 
about the technological differences between countries or types of bank, and about 
changes in technological progress and its spill-over. In particular, the identification and 
analysis of the characteristics of the technical leaders in the region (i.e. the banks on the 
meta-frontier, with TGR values close to or equal to 1) is especially revealing in this 
respect.  
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Since the meta-frontier is a deterministic method no statistical distribution is modelled 
for the estimators, which rules out the possibility of statistical testing. To overcome this 
limitation we use bootstrapping techniques and construct confidence intervals and test 
statistics on the basis of 1000 bootstrap repetitions. 
5.  Empirical results 
In this section we first discuss the results of the estimation of the country-specific 
frontiers and the determinants of banks cost efficiency. We then look at the results of 
the estimation of the meta-frontier and discuss in particular the dynamics of banks TGR 
scores.  
5.1 Country-specific stochastic frontiers. 
Table 4 reports the results from the estimation of the country frontiers. The top part of 
the table shows the main results of the cost frontier itself, the bottom part the marginal 
effects of the determinants of inefficiency
7
.  
Insert Table 4 here 
All cost frontiers meet their theoretical requirements, with positive and significant 
elasticities with respect to output levels and input prices. The third output of net fees 
and commissions shows limited significance, probably due to its low levels in the 
production technology of Asian banks. A simpler Cobb-Douglas technology is strongly 
rejected in all cases
8
 and constant or very mildly decreasing returns to scale characterise 
production. This means that scale economies have generally been exhausted, the 
structural reorganization following the crisis has been successful (Klapper et al., 2014) 
and further increases in bank size would not be recommended. The effect of time in 
terms of technological progress varies considerably. Indonesia and the Philippines have 
                                                 
7 We report the marginal effects directly, rather than the estimated coefficients, as they are more 
directly interpretable. 
8 This is Wald test 1 in the table. 
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a significant concave pattern in cost, with initial technological regress followed by an 
improvement later into the data series. Thailand and Japan have the very opposite 
pattern, while other countries show mixed, non-significant changes. The risk measures 
have consistent and significant impacts on total costs. Increases in capital ratios in most 
cases have a cost reduction effect. This lends support to the view that if banks are 
perceived as safer they can benefit from a lower cost of borrowing, counterbalancing the 
effect of the higher price of capital. The result is in line with Isik and Hassan (2002) and 
Havrylchyk (2006). The exceptions are Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand who 
also have the largest capital ratios of the sample (see Table 2). This suggests that the 
effect on costs of capital ratios might not be linear but depend on the variable’s level. 
The negative coefficient of VOroa suggests that the pursuit of higher risk projects is not 
matched by the use of more sophisticated and thus more expensive activities to manage 
them. Again a possibly non-linear pattern is suggested by the significant positive 
coefficient for Thailand who also has the highest levels of VOroa in the sample.  This 
would explain the contradictory conclusions reached by previous literature as of the 
effect of different risk variables. Finally loan loss provisions have a cost increasing effect, 
as they indicate a lowering of the quality of the loan portfolio and an increase in the 
likelihood of default. Deregulation and re-regulation in aggregate have a limited effect 
on the cost technology as such, whereas they have a significant effect, as we will see, on 
efficiency
9
. The only country where deregulation has a significant cost reduction effect is 
China, which is also the only case where regulatory policies do not affect efficiency at 
all. China of course is the only transition economy in the sample; it is not surprising 
                                                 
9 The lack of significance could also be due to the fact that these are aggregate measures. This would be 
the case if different regulatory policies were to affect technology, and not just efficiency, in a different 
way; or if low variability were to result from the components moving in opposite directions. We thank 
an anonymous referee for pointing this out. Unfortunately, as mentioned in footnote 6, econometric 
requirements prevented us from entering these variables in a disaggregated form in this part of the 
frontier. 
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then that the changes induced by deregulation would be much more far fetching than in 
other countries, and affect the whole technology of production, rather than just the 
efficiency with which some banks adopt it. Conversely re-regulation is generally 
expected to increase costs but this is significant only in Japan. Deregulation also has a 
positive albeit economically very small effect in Japan and a very sizeable one instead in 
the Philippines
10
. Finally, the lack of significance of GDP growth is probably a result of 
the exhaustiveness of the model. GDP growth in fact is included as a residual category 
of the general macroeconomic environment, and most of the effects are already 
satisfactorily captured by the model specification, in particular by the time trend and the 
policy variables
11
.  
Turning to inefficiency, this is highly significant in all countries, it is on average quite 
high and changes moderately over time (as shown later in Figure 4). The regulatory 
variables are jointly significant in determining it
12
  except in China: as we said above, 
policy changes in this country seem to directly affect the technology of production, 
rather than the efficiency with which it is applied by individual banks. Overall 
deregulation policies tend to improve efficiency whereas re-regulation ones tend to 
reduce it. Individual significance levels vary, probably also a reflection of the correlation 
between measures. If we focus on the sign of the various coefficients, the removal of 
activities restrictions (ACTR) generally improves efficiency, except in China and 
Thailand. The result for Thailand can be explained by the historical pattern of the 
changes in the variable. Being the first and possibly the worst hit by the Asian crisis, 
unlike in most of its regional peers, in Thailand the level of activity restrictions increases 
over time. The fact that lower restrictions are linked to higher inefficiency has probably 
                                                 
10 The size of the coefficient for the Philippines has to be taken with caution as the variable’s high 
levels and low variability make it highly correlated with the intercept.  
11 This is true also if we use GDP per capita instead of GDP growth. 
12 This is Wald test 2 in the table. 
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a lot to do with the proximity to the crisis itself, as confirmed also by the convex time 
trend (indicating improvements in efficiency over time).  In general the difference in 
sign, size and significance could be due to the level of development of the banking 
sector and the experience of its managers at dealing with activities other than traditional 
intermediation; but also to the level of implementation of the policy itself (see Table 3).  
Credit market deregulation (CMD) instead has an almost invariably positive and 
significant effect on efficiency. This result is to be expected as the variable measures 
things such as competition from foreign banks and the removal of controls on interest 
rates, all of which are expected to be beneficial to the efficiency of banks. Only in Hong 
Kong, who has the highest levels of deregulation of the sample, does this effect become 
negative, although its size is very small. Similarly to the effect of capital ratios on the 
costs of production, higher capital stringency requirements (CAPS) generally reduce 
efficiency, with the notable exception of Japan whose levels are however among the 
lowest in the sample. The negative effect is particularly strong in the Philippines, which 
adopted the most stringent rules of all. The results lend some support to Barth et al. 
(2006), who found no evidence that stringent capital regulations enhance the efficiency 
of bank intermediation. Increases in supervisory powers (SUPP) also mostly affect 
efficiency negatively, with the exception of Hong Kong and Malaysia. For the former 
the effect is very small to be economically meaningful; for the latter it probably 
counterbalances the inefficiency deriving from the country’s relatively high 
consolidation and family ownership, as showed also by the result on HHI (Abdul-Majid 
et al., 2011). Finally, unlike most of the established empirical literature we find a 
positive, sizeable and significant effect of market discipline (MARD) on efficiency only 
for the Philippines, the rest of the sample being negative. This supports the view that for 
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private monitoring to be effective the quality of information is crucial, and this is a 
bigger problem in developing countries.  
There are several possible explanations to the negative or limited effectiveness of re-
regulation on efficiency. First, government intervention may intensify agency problems 
thus hindering the progress of cost performance. Secondly, institutional weaknesses 
may undermine the quality and effectiveness of official supervision. Most Asian 
economies lack trained and experienced regulators, and suffer from poor quality on-site 
supervision and ineffective law enforcement. In extreme cases supervisors might even 
abuse their powers to benefit some parties or extract bribes. Finally, as we said above, 
disclosure-based supervisory strategies will be less effective in developing countries 
given that informational asymmetries are large and the production of timely and 
accurate information is costlier. These potential negative effects of re-regulatory 
instruments should be carefully considered by policy makers when revising regulatory 
frameworks.  
Turning to the other determinants of inefficiency, State banks are generally more 
efficient than their domestic private counterparts (except in China), whereas 
cooperatives, when they exist, less so. The difference between foreign and domestic 
private banks is mixed, confirming that no firm conclusion can be drawn about the 
prevalence of the home field vs. the global advantage effect discussed in the literature 
(Claessens and Van Horen, 2014). The degree of concentration also has a mixed effect.  
According to microeconomic theory, the effect of market concentration on cost 
efficiency is determined by two opposite factors: the negative effect of market power, 
which reduces the incentives to minimise costs; and the positive effect of scale 
economies. The former may well be the case of Malaysia, where a second round of 
consolidation in 2001-2004 initiated by major large-sized banks with overlapping market 
Page | 27 
 
segmentation is likely to have raised profits rather than improved cost efficiency (Abdul-
Majid et al., 2011). The latter is instead probably the case of China where consolidation 
was dominated by small- and medium-sized banks trying to enjoy scale and scope 
economies to improve their competitiveness against the larger incumbents. 
5.2 The estimation of the meta-frontier 
Table 5 reports the main results from the estimation of the meta-frontier, along with the 
confidence intervals and standard errors derived from bootstrapping. Inputs and 
outputs elasticities have again the expected sign. As was the case for many country 
frontiers, fees and commissions (q3) are not significant. The convex pattern of the time 
trend suggests improvements of the meta-technology until about 2009 and a worsening 
thereafter. This finding is in line with that of Sun and Chang (2011) who analyse the 
period 1998-2008 and find a worsening of technology immediately after the crisis and 
improvements from around 2001, which is the starting point of our dataset. Better 
resources spent on risk control, new business initiatives and technological innovation 
might have contributed to this pattern of cost technology. Loan loss provisions (LLP) 
are very significant both statistically and economically at increasing costs; this is 
consistent with theoretical expectations especially given the efforts that some banks had 
to make to clean up their balance sheets after the crisis. VOroa and CR have a cost 
reducing effect, in line with the interpretation provided before, although the former this 
time is not significant.  
Finally, while financial deregulation significantly lowers costs, the positive effect of re-
regulation is not significant. This implies that if deregulation and re-regulation policies 
were to be carried out together the total net effect would be a positive reduction in total 
costs, which is good news from a regulator’s point of view.  
Insert Table 5 here 
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We can now turn our attention to the final part of the analysis which is the cross 
country comparison and in particular the identification of ‘technical leaders’, which we 
will define shortly.  
As explained in Section 4.3 the distance of each bank from the meta-frontier, or meta-
cost efficiency (Meta-CE), can be broken down into the product of two separate 
components: the country-specific cost efficiency (CE) discussed before, and the 
technical gap ratio (TGR). The TGR is the distance between the country-specific 
frontier and the meta-frontier and therefore measures how advanced the technology of 
a particular bank or country is. We define as ‘technical leader’ a bank whose TGR 
score is at least 0.99
13
. These are the banks that push the meta-technology forward, or 
put otherwise the technological innovators across the region. Identifying these banks 
and their characteristics is one of the great advantages of the meta-frontier approach. 
The top half of Table 6 reports for each country the median
14
 TGR, CE and Meta-CE 
scores across the whole 2001-2010 period. Figure 4 plots the yearly values of TGR and 
CE for each country. 
Insert Table 6 here 
Insert Figure 4 here 
Several interesting things can be observed from Table 6 and Figure 4. First of all, the 
country-specific efficiency levels are all quite high (all well above 90%), and do not 
change much over time (median yearly changes range from the -1.4% of Malaysia to the 
+1.6% of Indonesia). High average levels are often found in country-specific studies, 
and the emphasis in such studies is usually more on the detailed performance of 
specific banks or groups of banks. As can be expected TGR levels are a lot lower, and 
                                                 
13 Given the deterministic nature of the methodology, restricting the analysis to scores of exactly 1 
would reduce the number of relevant observations quite significantly. 
14 Since these variables have very skewed distributions the median is preferred to the mean as a 
measure of central tendency. 
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their pattern varies a lot across the sample. China and Japan are the top performers, 
with the highest median scores of 0.92 and 0.91 respectively and (as we will see later) 
also the highest number of technical leaders. Japan suffers an early drop in 
performance around 2002, which corresponds to the implementation of its biggest 
changes in regulatory policy, and recovers thereafter. We attribute Japan’s good 
performance to its wide ranging reforms - the so-called ‘Financial Big Bang’ that started 
in the late 1990s but continued well into the 2000s. This stimulated market-based 
mechanisms and increased banks’ productivity (Aronson, 2013; Casu et al., 2015). 
Furthermore, banking innovations such as the IT revolution of the early 2000s, aimed 
at providing high-quality services, could have contributed to the superior technological 
performance of Japanese banks.  
China displays an increasing trend in TGR, which overtakes Japan’s in 2006 when the 
second round of policy changes, started in 2003, is finally in full swing (Klapper et al., 
2014). It is during this period that the country accelerates what had previously been a 
fairly cautious programme of reforms, by further opening to foreign banks, adopting 
more modern corporate structures and creating a separate regulator (the CBRC), 
independent from the Central Bank. As was also shown in Table 1, and in line with 
Chan et al. (2014), this translated in improved performance. This cautious yet 
progressive approach clearly pays off in terms of performance and, as shown below, 
gives many Chinese private banks a leading position across the region.  
Hong Kong’s bimodal shape, with a fall in 2006-2007, corresponds initially to a 
loosening in regulation and then to the financial crisis which affected many of Hong 
Kong banks, most of which are foreign subsidiaries. Malaysia is the worst performer in 
the sample, and its pattern of TGR worsens over time. Close to Malaysia are the 
Philippines, which however partly improve their performance over time. The poor 
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performance of Malaysia can be ascribed to its increasingly stringent capital norms, and 
to the reduction in competition and efficiency brought about by higher concentration 
and by the adoption of prudential policies that restricted foreign bank entry and 
branching. 
The lower half of Table 6 (Panel B) reports the main results from the analysis of 
technical leaders. These are the banks that create and push the best technology forward 
with a TGR score of at least 0.99
15
. There are 77 technical leaders over the whole time 
period 2001-2010. Of these 45 are Chinese banks and 19 are Japanese banks, followed 
at some distance by 7 banks in Hong Kong and negligible numbers elsewhere. Chinese 
banks start to appear among the technical leaders in 2003 and in particular from 2006 
onwards – corresponding to the fuller implementation of the reform process in the 
country. As Table 6 shows, private banks play a predominant role, accounting for 74% 
of the technical leaders; foreign banks follow with 18%, cooperatives with 8% and State 
banks with 0%. The strong implication is that State and possibly cooperative banks are 
not leaders in adopting or promoting technological innovation. Privatization policies 
and the opening to foreign bank entry are instead essential in promoting innovation in 
banking services and allowing spill-over effects across countries. This result is consistent 
with the findings of Luo et al. (2015) and is in line with the more recent analyses of the 
banking reforms in China reviewed in Section 3.  More generally it supports that large 
theoretical literature that emphasizes the innovation-inducing effects of private 
ownership and foreign bank entry. Indeed while the proportion of foreign banks among 
technical leaders might seem relatively small it is actually consistent with the fact that 
                                                 
15 Following the advice of an anonymous referee we have carried out two forms of sensitivity analysis 
of these results.  First we tried a more generous threshold of 0.95 in the definition of technical leaders; 
then we progressively removed the top countries from the meta-frontier. The results are consistent to 
both modifications: Chinese and Japanese banks still account for about 90% of the technical leaders of 
the sample in the first case. In the second sensitivity test, the rankings of technical leaders are the same, 
with second tier banks becoming first tier banks as expected. 
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their overall proportion in Asian markets is generally low. Their presence at the top of 
the frontier, instead of the more prevalent state banks, is therefore particularly telling. 
6. Conclusions 
This study examines the impact of different deregulation and re-regulation policies on 
banks’ cost efficiency and technology whilst controlling for ownership type, risk and 
concentration levels. The focus of the analysis has been on eight major Asian 
economies in the period 2001-2010, which saw renewed interest on policy reform 
following the Asian financial crisis. Due to technological heterogeneity we first estimate 
country-specific frontiers, then pool the data to estimate a meta-frontier and examine 
the factors that affect the meta-cost technology.  
The country-specific frontiers show that deregulation of interest rates, removal of 
activities restrictions and foreign bank entry generally improve the efficiency with which 
banks perform their operations. This is especially so in countries where regulatory 
changes have been more pronounced, and less so where further scope for liberalization 
is more limited, suggesting possible non-linear effects. Capital markets deregulation is 
also consistently efficiency-enhancing. This finding underscores the importance of 
further liberalising banking systems in Asia if cost reduction is seen as key in improving 
financial access and growth. Bank re-regulation has instead a generally negative effect on 
banks efficiency, although less pronounced that the effect of deregulation. The negative 
effect of tighter capital requirements is possibly non-linear and kicks in only at higher 
levels of stringency. Stronger supervisory powers and market discipline affect efficiency 
negatively, contrary to the theoretical expectations of some of the literature. The overall 
negative effect on cost efficiency of re-regulatory policies might be linked to the level of 
development of the banking systems, and it should be carefully considered by policy 
makers when revising regulatory frameworks. 
Page | 32 
 
The results of the meta-frontier, which represents the best technology across the region, 
show that deregulation policies have a significant beneficial effect on technology, 
pushing the frontier ahead, while re-regulatory ones are not significant. Putting the two 
sets of results together it would seem that deregulation can help improve the technology 
of production as well as the efficiency with which banks apply such technology. 
Regulation instead, while not impeding technological improvements, impairs the 
efficiency with which banks can perform their operations.  
Technological improvements, measured by the TGR values, take place over time along 
with the positive impact of deregulation, slowing down later in concomitance with the 
impact of re-regulation policies and with the global financial crisis. These technological 
improvements are mainly led by Japan and China, and in particular by private and 
foreign banks; we find no state banks and very few cooperatives among the technology 
leaders, confirming the view that policies that promote privatization and foreign bank 
entry are key to innovation and efficiency.  
Overall, the coexistence of deregulatory and re-regulatory frameworks observed in Asia 
has been beneficial for banks’ cost performance in the past decade. However, there are 
signs of a slowing down of such performance in more recent years, which may be 
associated with the increasing emphasis on bank prudential re-regulation. These results 
highlight the importance of combining policies which aim to foster financial stability 
with policies which promote financial intermediation.  
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Appendix A 
Table A1 Variables specification 
Variable Definition Source 
Dependent Variable 
TC Total Cost (TC) = Interest Expenses + Operating 
Expenses 
Bankscope 
Determinants of the cost frontier 
PL (w1) Price of Labour = Personnel Expenses /Total 
Assets 
Bankscope 
PC (w2) Price of Capital = (Other Operating Expenses + 
Loan and other Impaired changes) / Total Assets 
Bankscope 
PF (w3) Price of Funds = Interest Expenses/ (Total 
Deposits+ Money Market and Short-term funding 
+Other Funding+ Long-term Funding) 
Bankscope 
LN (q1) Net Loans = Gross Loans – Reserves for Impaired 
Loans 
Bankscope 
OEA (q2) Other Earning Assets  Bankscope 
NFC (q3) Net Fees and Commissions  Bankscope 
Risk factors  
CR Equity Capital Ratio = (Equity Capital+ Reserves) 
/(Total Loans) 
Bankscope 
VOroa Volatility of ROA = Standard Deviation of Return 
on Assets 
Bankscope 
LLP  Loan Loss Provisions = Reserves for Impaired 
Loans/Total Loans  
Bankscope 
GDP Annual GDP Growth Rate World 
Development 
Indicators (WDI) 
Dereg Deregulation indicator, average of the (normalised) 
ACTR and CMD. 
(Barth et al., 2001, 
2003, 2007, 2012) 
Rereg Re-regulation indicator, average of the (normalised) 
CAPS, SUPP and MARD. 
(Barth et al., 2001, 
2003, 2007, 2012) 
Determinants of inefficiency  
ACTR  Activities restrictions: the index measures the 
degree to which banks are allowed to engage in fee-
based activities, and the degree of regulatory 
restrictiveness on the mixing of banking and 
commerce. The degree of restrictiveness for each 
activity is measured on a scale from 1 to 4, 
corresponding to ‘prohibited’ ‘restricted’, 
‘permitted’, and ‘unrestricted’.  The index is the 
average scale across the activities.  
(Barth et al., 2001, 
2003, 2007, 2012) 
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CMD  Credit market deregulation: the index reflects the 
degree of banking market liberalization and it 
includes information on 4 categories: the 
ownership of banks, foreign bank competition, 
private sector credit and interest rate controls. Each 
category is assigned values between 0 to10, 
increasing with openness. The index is the average 
of the values across the categories.  
Index of Economic 
Freedom Database 
Heritage 
Foundation 
CAPS  Capital stringency: the index is based on the 
answers to the survey questions regarding the 
overall capital stringency. The values assigned to 
the index range from 0 to 7, with higher values 
indicating greater capital stringency. 
(Barth et al., 2001, 
2003, 2007, 2012) 
SUPP  Supervisory powers: the index measures whether 
supervisory authorities can take specific actions to 
prevent and correct problems. A value of 1 is 
assigned to a ‘yes’ answer and a value of 0 to a ‘no’ 
answer. This variable is the sum of these assigned 
values which range from 0 to 15, with higher values 
indicating greater supervisory power. 
(Barth et al., 2001, 
2003, 2007, 2012) 
MARD  Market discipline: the index captures the degree to 
which accurate information is disclosed to the 
public. The values assigned to the index range 
from 0 to 7, with higher values indicating more 
transparency and hence greater private supervisory 
power. 
(Barth et al., 2001, 
2003, 2007, 2012) 
State  Dummy variable set equal to 1 if banks are 
ultimately owned by the State, and 0 otherwise; 
Bankscope 
Private  Dummy variable set equal to 1 for domestic private 
banks, and 0 otherwise; 
Bankscope 
For  Dummy variable set equal to 1 if banks are 
ultimately owned by foreign organisations or other 
parties, 0 otherwise;  
Bankscope 
Coop  Dummy variable set equal to 1if banks are credit 
cooperatives and 0 otherwise. 
Bankscope 
HHI The Herfindahl - Hirschman Index. Values range 
from 0 to 1, with higher values indicating greater 
market concentration.  
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Table 1: Selected performance measures 2001-2010 
This table illustrates selected bank performance indicators for the countries in our sample: CN (China); 
HK (Hong Kong); ID (Indonesia); IN (India); JP (Japan); MY (Malaysia); PH (Philippines); TH 
(Thailand). South Asia illustrates the average for the region. EMU illustrates the average for the euro 
zone and US illustrates the average for the United States. NIM is the Net Interest Margin; CAR is the 
Capital to Assets Ratio; NPL is Non-Performing Loans; ROA is the Return of Assets; CIR is the Cost-to-
Income Ratio. The values reported are from the Global Financial Development database of the World 
Bank. 
Country Year NIM CAR NPL ROA CIR 
CN 2001 2.15 4.1 29.8 0.38 64.2 
 
2005 2.30 4.4 8.6 0.47 43.9 
 2010 2.49 6.1 1.1 1.12 30.9 
HK 2001 0.86 9.8 6.5 0.2 30.3 
 
2005 1.40 10.3 1.4 1.55 54.3 
 2010 2.12 13.3 0.8 1.21 55.8 
ID 2001 3.66 5.2 31.9 0.43 75.9 
 
2005 5.81 9.8 7.4 1.59 56.1 
 2010 6.64 11.4 2.6 2.14 39.1 
IN 2001 3.04 5.3 11.4 0.72 63.0 
 
2005 3.38 6.4 5.2 0.98 53.0 
 2010 3.34 7.1 2.4 1.07 36.2 
JP 2001 1.26 3.9 8.4 -0.69 59.4 
 
2005 1.14 4.9 1.8 0.5 53.8 
 2010 1.11 4.8 1.8 0.25 55.2 
MY 2001 3.54 8.3 17.8 0.77 43.6 
 
2005 3.50 7.7 9.6 1.49 35.2 
 2010 2.99 9.1 3.4 1.35 37.4 
PH 2001 2.28 13.6 27.7 0.18 93.7 
 
2005 4.82 12.0 10.0 1.36 64.6 
 2010 3.99 11.7 3.8 1.41 51.1 
TH 2001 1.82 8.9 11.5 1.45 75.5 
 
2005 3.04 8.9 9.1 1.35 49.9 
 2010 3.26 11.3 3.9 1.22 44.0 
South 2001 3.27 3.8 23.4 0.65 53.9 
Asia 2005 4.12 7.2 6.8 1.17 60.8 
  2010 5.34 9.3 5.2 1.15 48.9 
EMU 2001 2.36 5.9 2.30 0.50 63.7 
 2005 2.24 6.2 2.50 0.80 58.8 
  2010 1.68 5.9 2.20 0.30 64.7 
US 2001 3.84 9.00 1.30 1.13 58.99 
 2005 3.49 10.3 0.70 1.30 58.31 
  2010 3.82 12.7 4.40 0.65 58.59 
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Table 2 Sample descriptive statistics, 2001-2010 
This table reports descriptive statistics for the variables used in the empirical analysis.  The countries in our sample are denoted as follows: CN (China); HK (Hong Kong); ID 
(Indonesia); IN (India); JP (Japan); MY (Malaysia); PH (Philippines); TH (Thailand). For the definition and construction of the variables see Appendix A. Notes: a) Average 
total assets, total cost and outputs (rows 2-6): values are reported in $mil, deflated using 2005 as base year. b) Average input prices (rows 7-9), values are reported in $10,000. c) 
GDP growth (row 10) is the average % yearly value. d) Risk indicators (rows 11-13) are median % values. e) Dereg (row 16) is the aggregate deregulatory measure, computed as 
the average of rows 14-15. Rereg (row 20) is the aggregate re-regulatory measure, computed as the average of rows 17-19.  f) All regulatory indices are scaled by the maximum 
possible value of each group to ensure they are all bound between 0 and 1 to ease comparison. Their values in the table are reported in %. g) Ownership is measured as the % of 
total assets of each category. 
Row Categories Variables CN HK ID IN JP MY PH TH 
1 Obs. Tot. banks 615 251 435 555 1080 231 261 148 
2 Average Size Tot. Asset (TA) 66365 33032 2965 13674 62256 10791 2572 14767 
3 Dep var Tot. Cost (TC) 1890 862 269 953 983 443 161 624 
4 
Outputs (q) 
Net Loans (LN) 34224 13663 1310 7642 35228 6388 1114 9627 
5 Other Earning Assets (OEA) 26864 16317 1277 4549 23983 1453 1083 4000 
6 Net Fees & Commissions (NFC) 275 337 39 175 249 107 44 183 
7 
Input prices (w) 
Price of Labor (PL) 0.501 0.77 1.42 1.11 0.57 0.69 1.55 0.81 
8 Price of Capital (PC) 1.06 0.84 2.27 1.62 0.99 1.16 3.11 1.87 
9 Price of Funds (PF) 1.96 2.17 6.05 5.35 0.25 2.60 3.85 2.21 
10 Macro (GDP) GDP growth 10.9 4.0 5.2 7.2 0.7 4.5 4.8 4.3 
11 Risk indicators (RK) Equity Capital Ratio (CR) 7.62 14.90 15.88 10.75 6.59 13.55 20.54 13.11 
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12 Volatility of ROA (VOroa) 0.36 0.36 0.62 0.31 0.26 0.46 0.52 0.62 
13 Loan Loss Provisions (LLP) 1.78 1.03 2.64 1.49 1.51 3.85 5.86 5.00 
14 
Dereg. indicators 
Activities restrictions (ACTR) 34.8 91.6 36.6 51.9 55.0 56.9 81.3 49.3 
15 Credit market deregulation (CMD) 66.1 95.1 74.8 67.3 80.9 82.5 82.8 81.3 
16 Deregulation (Dereg) 50.5 93.4 55.7 59.6 68.0 69.7 82.1 65.3 
17 
Rereg. 
indicators 
Capital stringency (CAPS) 24.1 60.5 39.0 59.0 37.6 38.2 63.0 43.2 
18 Supervisory powers (SUPP) 69.2 53.2 78.4 63.6 69.0 67.1 79.6 66.6 
19 Market discipline (MARD) 75.4 83.0 63.7 60.7 63.6 74.9 74.0 74.6 
20 Reregulation (Rereg) 56.2 65.6 60.3 61.1 56.8 60.1 72.2 61.5 
21 
Ownership 
State (State) 68.0 0.00 51.0 73.8 0.00 22.9 8.3 35.0 
22 Private (Private) 29.4 20.4 18.4 20.9 100 54.6 90.43 60.0 
23 Foreign (For) 1.1 79.6 30.6 4.48 0.00 22.5 1.25 5.00 
24 Cooperative (Coop) 1.5 0.00 0.00 0.82 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 
25 Concentr. Herfindahl Index (HHI) 12.91 25.89 10.36 7.20 7.22 9.55 9.28 10.54 
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Table 3 Changes in the regulatory environment – selected indicators 
This table illustrates selected bank regulation indicators for the countries in our sample: CN (China); HK 
(Hong Kong); ID (Indonesia); IN (India); JP (Japan); MY (Malaysia); PH (Philippines); TH (Thailand). 
ACT is Activity Restrictions; CMD is Credit Market Deregulation; Dereg is an aggregate deregulation 
index. The higher the index value, the more deregulated the banking system. CAPS is an indicator of 
capital stringency; SUPP indicates supervisory powers; MARD indicates market discipline; Rereg is an 
aggregate re-regulation index. Higher values of the index indicate more stringent regulation. The values 
reported are from the Bank Regulation and Supervision around the World surveys carried out by the 
World Bank, apart from the indicator of Credit Market Deregulation, which is from the Index of 
Economic Freedom Database complied by the Heritage Foundation. 
 
    Deregulation indicators Reregulation indicators 
Country  Year  ACTR  CMD Dereg   CAPS  SUPP  MARD  Rereg 
CN 2001  37.5  60.0  49.0  8.3  66.7  63.6  46.2  
 
2004  37.5  64.0  51.0  8.3  66.7  63.6  46.2  
 
2007  31.3  70.0  51.0  16.7  71.0  73.0  53.6  
 2010  37.5  66.0  52.0  66.7  69.7  100.0  78.8  
HK 2001  87.5  98.0  93.0  66.7  54.8  83.0  68.2  
 
2004  87.5  95.0  91.0  66.7  54.8  83.0  68.2  
 
2007  93.8  95.0  94.0  41.7  46.7  83.0  57.1  
 2010  100.0  92.0  96.0  75.0  60.0  83.0  72.7  
ID 2001  37.5  78.0  58.0  25.0  80.6  58.3  54.7  
 
2004  37.5  66.0  52.0  25.0  80.6  58.3  54.7  
 
2007  25.0  82.0  53.0  41.7  83.9  67.0  64.2  
 
2010  56.3  77.0  67.0  75.0  67.7  74.0  72.2  
IN 2001  62.5  61.0  62.0  41.7  48.4  54.5  48.2  
 
2004  50.0  70.0  60.0  50.0  64.5  55.0  56.5  
 
2007  56.3  71.0  64.0  58.3  67.7  63.0  63.0  
 2010  43.8  66.0  55.0  91.7  61.9  74.0  75.9  
JP 2001  43.8  84.0  64.0  41.7  64.5  50.0  52.1  
 
2004  56.3  77.0  67.0  41.7  69.0  63.0  57.9  
 
2007  56.3  85.0  71.0  33.3  70.0  67.0  56.8  
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2010  56.3  77.0  66.0  33.3  70.0  67.0  56.8  
MY 2001  62.5  77.0  70.0  16.7  76.7  75.0  56.1  
 
2004  56.3  77.0  67.0  16.7  64.5  78.0  53.1  
 
2007  56.3  91.0  74.0  50.0  71.0  71.0  64.0  
 2010  56.3  85.0  71.0  75.0  65.2  74.0  71.4  
PH 2001  81.3  88.0  85.0  50.0  77.4  71.7  66.4  
 
2004  81.3  79.0  80.0  50.0  80.6  66.0  65.5  
 
2007  81.3  84.0  83.0  66.7  82.1  80.0  76.3  
 
2010  81.3  82.0  82.0  91.7  74.0  83.0  82.9  
TH 2001  68.8  78.0  73.0  33.3  73.3  65.8  57.5  
 
2004  50.0  75.0  63.0  25.0  63.3  73.0  53.8  
 
2007  43.8  86.0  65.0  41.7  64.5  83.0  63.1  
 2010  50.0  82.0  66.0  83.3  74.0  67.0  74.8  
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Table 4 Summary results from the country-specific stochastic frontier estimations 
This table reports the results of the country-specific stochastic frontier estimations. The countries in our sample are denoted as follows: CN (China); HK (Hong Kong); ID 
(Indonesia); IN (India); JP (Japan); MY (Malaysia); PH (Philippines); TH (Thailand). For the definition and construction of the variables see Appendix A. T and T
2
 model the 
quadratic time trend. All regulatory indices are scaled by the maximum possible value of each group to ensure they are all bound between 0 and 1. Each marginal effect is 
calculated as (∂CE/∂zit), it is evaluated at the sample mean of z and it measures the % change of bank cost efficiency due to a unit change in z. A positive sign therefore 
indicates that the variable increases cost efficiency, and viceversa. 
Frontier estimation 
Country   CN HK ID IN JP MY PH TH 
          Constant α0 1.888*** 1.725* 0.583 1.137*** 0.856*** 3.971*** -0.823 0.355 
GDP_growth ϑ 0.004 0.006 0.030** -0.0003 0.001*         0.003 0.001 -0.003 
T η1 -0.011 -0.031 0.020* -0.0025 -0.001*** 0.040** 0.054*** -0.037*** 
T2 η2 0.000 0.002 -0.003** 0.000 0.001*** -0.002 -0.004*** 0.003** 
CR γ1 -0.385*** -0.326*** -0.676*** -0.055*** -0.215*** 0.304*** 0.065*** 0.044 
VOroa γ2 -2.597** -0.081 -0.100 -0.953* -0.202** -0.783 -0.128 1.334*** 
LLP γ3 0.546*** 0.018 0.053 0.246*** 0.282*** 0.696** 0.714*** 0.026 
Dereg θ1 -1.204** 0.147 0.463** 0.043 0.070** 0.244 2.262*** -0.294 
Rereg θ2 -0.005 0.054 0.193 0.066 0.208*** -0.144 -0.199 -0.037 
Wald Test (1) 
 
2287.045*** 1318.009*** 781.811*** 755.428*** 7050.064*** 526.698*** 919.485*** 2036.998*** 
          
Input elasticities             
dlntc/dlnw1 
 
0.154*** 0.209***  0.165*** 0.146*** 0.320*** 0.160*** 0.239*** 0.182*** 
dlntc/dlnw2 
 
0.324*** 0.263*** 0.264*** 0.202*** 0.550*** 0.268*** 0.302*** 0.387*** 
dlntc/dlnw3 
 
0.523*** 0.528*** 0.571*** 0.652*** 0.129*** 0.572*** 0.459*** 0.431*** 
          Output elasticities        
dlntc/dlnQ1 
 
0.626*** 0.526*** 0.568*** 0.603*** 0.673*** 0.629*** 0.546*** 0.770*** 
dlntc/dlnQ2 
 
0.371*** 0.477*** 0.423*** 0.401*** 0.321*** 0.334*** 0.427*** 0.259*** 
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dlntc/dlnQ3 
 
0.007*** 0.001 0.008 -0.005 0.003*** 0.019 0.039** -0.002 
Scales economies  1.004 1.004 0.999 0.999 0.998 0.982 1.012 1.027 
          
Inefficiency determinants: Marginal effects 
 
  
CN HK ID IN JP MY PH TH 
ACTR δ1 -0.003 0.0001*** 0.017*** 0.056 0.015*** 0.010 - -0.021** 
CMD δ2 -0.040 -0.001*** 0.089** 0.051*** 0.023*** 0.064** 0.182** 0.014** 
CAPS δ3 -0.008 0.0000 -0.017*** -0.013** 0.037*** -0.030** -0.203* -0.002 
SUPP δ4 -0.006 0.0001*** -0.029*** -0.188* -0.014*** 0.053*** -0.236** -0.007 
MARD δ5 -0.009 
 
-0.023*** -0.005 -0.008*** -0.038** 0.263* -0.044** 
STATE δ6 -0.002* 
 
0.004** 0.007* - 0.027*** 0.000 0.003** 
FOR δ7 0.001 0.0001*** -0.001* -0.013** - -0.019*** -0.003* 0.001** 
COOP δ8 -0.001 
 
- -0.007* - 
 
0.002 
 HHI δ9 0.267* 0.001*** -0.041*** -0.376* 0.038*** -0.033** -0.246* 0.092* 
T δ10 0.003 -0.0001*** 0.005*** -0.003*** 0.0004*** -0.014*** 0.007** -0.001*** 
T2 δ11 -0.000 0.0000*** -0.0004** 
 
0.0002** 0.0000 0.001*** 0.0003*** 0.0002*** 
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Table 5. Main results from the estimation of the Meta-frontier 
This table reports the results of the meta-frontier. The countries in our sample are denoted as follows: 
CN (China); HK (Hong Kong); ID (Indonesia); IN (India); JP (Japan); MY (Malaysia); PH (Philippines); 
TH (Thailand). Dereg is the aggregate index of deregulatory measures, computed as the average of the 
individual indices. Rereg is the aggregate index of re-regulatory measures, computed as the average of the 
individual indices.  For the definition and construction of the variables see Appendix A. 
Variable   Coef Std. Err t-ratio 
GDP growth ϑ -0.001 0.003 0.33 
T η1 -0.017 0.012 -1.42 
TT η2 0.001 0.001 1.00 
CR γ1 -0.464 0.065 -7.14 
VoRoa γ2 -0.975 0.934 -1.04 
LLP γ3 0.646 0.158 4.09 
Dereg θ1 -0.348 0.085 -4.07 
Rereg θ2 0.026 0.058 0.45 
Inputs elasticities 
   w1 
 
0.243*** 0.07 3.63 
w2 
 
0.372** 0.13 2.86 
w3 
 
0.385** 0.18 2.11 
Outputs elasticities 
   Q1 
 
0.639*** 0.10 6.39 
Q2 
 
0.379*** 0.09 4.21 
Q3 
 
0.007 0.02 0.35 
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Table 6. TGR, CE and Meta-CE median values, 2001-2010. 
Panel A of this table reports the median values of the technological gap ratio (TGR); the country-specific 
cost efficiency (CE) and the meta-frontier cost efficiency (Meta-CE). The TGR measures the distance 
between the meta-frontier and the country frontier and it is ≤ 1. The closer to 1 is a firm’s TGR value, the 
closer that firm is to using the optimal meta-technology.  Panel B of the table reports the total number of 
technical leaders (i.e. banks with TGR ≥ 0.99) in each country and their proportion in each ownership 
category. The countries in our sample are denoted as follows: CN (China); HK (Hong Kong); ID 
(Indonesia); IN (India); JP (Japan); MY (Malaysia); PH (Philippines); TH (Thailand). 
Panel A: Performance 
 CN HK ID IN JP MY PH TH All 
TGR 0.92 0.79 0.79 0.81 0.91 0.75 0.76 0.86 0.86 
CE 0.96 0.92 0.96 0.98 0.98 0.94 0.96 0.98 0.97 
Meta-CE 0.86 0.71 0.75 0.78 0.89 0.71 0.73 0.84 0.82 
Panel B: Technical leaders  
 CN HK ID IN JP MY PH TH All 
Number 45 7 1 1 19 2 0 2 77 
Proportion: 
State 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Private 0.71 0.29 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.74 
Foreign 0.16 0.71 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.18 
Coop 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.08 
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Figure 1: Changes in ownership structure  
The graph plots the changes in ownership structure in the countries in our sample: CN (China); HK 
(Hong Kong); ID (Indonesia); IN (India); JP (Japan); MY (Malaysia); PH (Philippines); TH (Thailand). 
Country-level data are from Bank Regulation and Supervision Survey (BRSS), Round I-IV, released by 
the World Bank in 2001, 2003, 2007 and 2012. The information reported corresponds to the period 
1998-99, 2001, 2005, 2008-2010, respectively.  HK data are compiled by the authors. 
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Figure 2: CR5 values, 1998-2010 
This graph plots the share five-firm concentration ratio (CR5) calculated as the sum of the assets 
held by top 5 banks in each country. The countries in our sample are denoted as follows: CN (China); 
HK (Hong Kong); ID (Indonesia); IN (India); JP (Japan); MY (Malaysia); PH (Philippines); TH 
(Thailand). Country-level data are from Bank Regulation and Supervision Survey (BRSS), Round I-IV, 
released by the World Bank in 2001, 2003, 2007 and 2012. The information reported corresponds to 
the period 1998-99, 2001, 2005, 2008-2010, respectively.  HK data are compiled by the authors. 
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Figure 3. Changes in deregulation and re-regulation aggregate indices: 2001-2010 
This graph plots the changes in the average deregulation and reregulation indices during the sample 
period. Dereg is the aggregate index of deregulatory measures, computed as the average of the individual 
indices. Rereg is the aggregate index of re-regulatory measures, computed as the average of the individual 
indices.  For the definition and construction of the variables see Appendix A. 
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Figure 4. Change of median performance measures over time  
This graph plots the evolution of cost efficiency and technological gap ratios (TGR) during the 
sample period. The countries in our sample are denoted as follows: CN (China); HK (Hong Kong); ID 
(Indonesia); IN (India); JP (Japan); MY (Malaysia); PH (Philippines); TH (Thailand). 
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